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Since the early 1980s the problem of corruption and issues of governance have 
come to the fore in all South Asian countries. Internal public concern over 
corruption, and pressure from international agencies, such as the World Bank and 
the IMF, and from bilateral agencies alarmed by the misuse of aid, has been 
growing. Closely linked to the issue of corruption is a wider set of concerns 
regarding governance, including the operation of the judicial system, the stability 
of property rights, and the functioning of democracy. Corruption has been 
foremost on the agenda, out of all these issues, as it is widely perceived to be not 
just a problem in itself but also an indicator of other failures of governance. In 
response to internal and external pressures, political parties in South Asia have 
adopted anti-corruption programmes, although usually only as populist slogans or 
to attack their opponents. Furthermore, citizens’ groups and local and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have led intense campaigns and, 
significantly, a mainstreaming of anti-corruption policies by the World Bank and 
other international agencies has occurred. However, the problem of corruption 
persists in South Asia, as measured by the intense public debate on and media 
coverage of corruption, the ongoing concern of international agencies and 
investors, as well as the poor showing of these countries in international rankings 
of corruption indices constructed by the NGO Transparency International and 
other such agencies. 
Since the early 1980s prime ministers and presidents in Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan have been legally implicated in and sometimes even convicted of 
corruption, and in Nepal and Sri Lanka prime ministers have been regularly 
accused of corruption by their political rivals and the media. Provincial, state and 
local governments have been accused of being equally corrupt, with a number of 
flamboyant chief ministers in India acquiring an international reputation for 
corruption. The form of government also seems to have had little effect on the 
magnitude of corruption, with both democracies and authoritarian regimes 
displaying equally high levels of corruption. Public disclosures of large-scale 
corruption in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have recently been dominated by 
major irregularities in government procurements, in particular of defence-related 
equipment. While in the past public-sector industries attracted the most attention 
for nepotism and clientelism, recently a number of spectacular corruption-related 
scandals and crises in privatization deals and the regulation of financial markets 
have been exposed. At a lower level, government functionaries of all types are 
widely engaged in corruption; police, customs, land registration and irrigation 
officials receive frequent negative attention in the media. In public opinion 
surveys, police forces throughout the Indian subcontinent are often accused of 
being the most corrupt agencies, not necessarily because they appropriate the 
greatest amount in bribes but because for most people their corruption is the most 
visible and irksome on a daily basis. This qualitative and journalistic evidence of 
widespread corruption in South Asia is supported by surveys of public perceptions 
of corruption  that are collated by the World Bank to provide indices for the 
‘control of corruption’ in different countries. These indices are constructed in such 
a way that they range from -2.5 (the worst corruption) to +2.5 (the lowest 
corruption), with the average of all countries indices being 0. Under each index is 
the standard error, which shows the degree of confidence given the variation in the 
indices available for each country. 
 
Control of Corruption Index for South Asia  
(range: -2.5 to +2.5, standard error shown in brackets) 
 Country  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
 Afghanistan na  na -1.56 -1.32 -1.33 
    (0.44) (0.27) (0.21) 
 
 Bangladesh  -0.47 -0.40 -0.60 -0.95 -1.09  
  (0.24) (0.21) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
 India -0.31 -0.17 -0.25 -0.36 -0.31 
  (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) 
 
 Maldives na -0.55 -0.45 -0.05 0.12 
   (0.37) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) 
 
 Nepal -0.28 -0.59 -0.56 -0.37 -0.61 
  (0.47) (0.27) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16) 
 
 Pakistan  -0.98 -0.76 -0.80 -0.81 -0.87 
  (0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
 
 Sri Lanka -0.23 -0.24 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 
  (0.24) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
Source: Kaufmann et. al. (2005)  
 Note: na = not available  
These indices should be interpreted carefully as they are based on subjective 
perceptions; however, they do suggest that official policies and pressure from 
NGOs and civil society had minimal effect on reducing corruption until 2004. 
According to these indices, corruption remained virtually unchanged in India in 
1996–2004. In Pakistan there was a small improvement (although the long-term 
anti-corruption achievements realized by the military, and now civilian, 
government might come under threat in the future), and in Bangladesh perceived 
corruption actually worsened, with the country registering one of the highest 
corruption ranking among the countries surveyed in 2004. There is considerable 
controversy in Bangladesh about whether the steep decline in these subjective 
indicators in recent years reveal more about the changing sensitivities of 
Bangladeshi respondents rather than real changes in the degree of corruption. 
Nevertheless, while subjective perception indices may not reflect true changes in 
the degree of corruption, at the very least they reveal growing public disquiet with 
slow progress in dealing with the problem. Sri Lanka, a much more developed 
nation, with a per caput gross national income two to three times higher than its 
neighbours, registered a correspondingly lower corruption index. However, even in 
Sri Lanka, corruption has become one of the main issues to dominate accusations 
and counter-accusations made by government and opposition parties. Nepal was 
included in the Transparency International Corruption Index for the first time in 
2004, receiving an identical rating to that of India. The small tourist island of 
Maldives has the lowest recorded corruption in the Indian subcontinent, and is the 
only South Asian country with a corruption indicator that is positive in 2004, 
which means a corruption ranking better than the global average. In contrast 
Afghanistan has the highest corruption indicator in the South Asia, reflecting the 
continuing role of warlords and criminality in its economy. Here the corruption is 
largely of a different type and magnitude, compared with its neighbours, since a 
nation-wide state structure does not exist, but there may be underlying tendencies 
that are quite similar to the other South Asian countries. 
The extent of corruption in South Asia has led to wider concern regarding poor 
governance, which in turn is responsible for poor economic performance, 
persistent poverty, the subversion of democracy and the inability to attract 
sufficient foreign investment. However, in assessing corruption in South Asia, it is 
desirable to remember that corruption is rife in all developing countries, regardless 
of their economic growth rates; indeed, the level of corruption is strongly 
connected to the country’s level of development. Generally, the poorer and less 
developed a country is, the more it suffers from corruption. This is even true of 
high-growth developing countries such as the Republic of Korea in the 1960s or 
the People’s Republic of China in the early 2000s. This cross-country evidence 
suggests that studying the aggregate evidence of corruption is likely to be 
misleading, since even rapidly growing economies experience relatively high 
levels of corruption in their nascent stages. Clearly, it is necessary to distinguish 
between different types of corruption and to identify why the more damaging types 
predominate in less dynamic economies such as those found in South Asia. This 
will also help to assess the likelihood of specific anti-corruption strategies 
succeeding. 
A Typology of South Asian Corruption 
Corruption can be defined in various ways, but it is typically understood to 
mean a violation of law by public officials for private gain. The violation of law 
may result in the provision of a proscribed service and/or the subversion of state 
policies in a way advantageous for the bribe-payer. At a general level, all 
corruption is damaging: time and resources are wasted in the paying of bribes, in 
identifying the officials to bribe and determining the amounts to pay, and all these 
resources could evidently have been better used in productive investments. 
Moreover, unlike taxes, the payment of a bribe is not guaranteed, and the public 
official taking bribes cannot be taken to court for the non-delivery of promised 
services or decisions. In addition, corruption can have important indirect effects on 
business confidence and thus on investments. Furthermore, corruption could 
potentially result in sudden changes in government policy or in the reallocation of 
property rights, thereby adversely affecting the investment climate and increasing 
the overall costs of corruption. However, while bribery always imposes a cost on 
society, the net economic effect of corruption also depends on the type of 
intervention or subversion of policy that is achieved as a result of the bribe. 
Violations of useful and necessary laws are clearly damaging for the economy, and 
examples of such corruption are not difficult to find in South Asia. In these cases 
corruption is unquestionably damaging for the economy. However, there are also 
many legal violations in developing countries that may be necessary. For instance, 
emerging capitalists might have to navigate around politically necessary but 
restrictive laws, or necessary interventions might exist that have not yet been 
legally sanctioned, or in some cases cannot be legally sanctioned for political 
reasons even though they are essential for maintaining political stability or 
economic growth. In these cases, the economic effects caused by the instance of 
corruption are anomalous; accordingly corruption could be associated with either 
stagnation or growth. These types of corruption can also be found in the South 
Asian countries. The distinction between types of corruption is important in order 
to understand both the economic and political effects of corruption and the 
appropriateness of different anti-corruption strategies. It is possible to distinguish 
between at least four types of corruption in South Asia, based on whether the 
underlying interventions are potentially necessary for economic or political 
reasons, and whether the law allows these interventions. This classification is 
shown below. 
i) Interventions that are required for economic development or political 
stability and are legally permitted: these types of corruption may be 
associated with growth or stagnation depending on how seriously necessary 
interventions (market regulation, promotion of industries, subsidies for 
political stabilization) are subverted. Anti-corruption policy should seek to 
improve implementation and reduce corruption, but not to remove the 
interventions 
ii) Interventions that are required for economic development or political 
stability but are legally prohibited: all these interventions are likely to 
involve corruption. These types of corruption may be associated with 
growth or stagnation depending on the nature and extent of these 
interventions (discriminatory benefits for powerful groups to maintain 
stability, preferential access to resources for emerging capitalists). Policy 
should focus on legalizing necessary interventions and reducing damaging 
interventions 
iii) Interventions that are not required for economic development or political 
stability and are legally permitted: these types of corruption are associated 
with dysfunctional interventions (unnecessary paperwork and permissions, 
protection of inefficient industries) and always have negative effects. 
Policy should seek to remove these state ‘functions’ (through liberalization 
and privatization). This has been the focus of mainstream anti-corruption 
strategies 
iv) Interventions that are not required for economic development or political 
stability and are legally prohibited: these are primarily predatory 
extortions. This type of corruption only begins to predominate in failed or 
failing states where armed groups can extort from society regardless of 
political stability or economic performance (intimidation by Afghan 
regional military commanders, extortion by political mafias). Effective 
policy has to strengthen the centralized coercive power of the state. 
The first type of corruption explained above is associated with interventions 
that are potentially necessary for the economy or polity, and are allowed and 
regulated by law. Examples of these interventions are subsidies to maintain 
political stability, tariffs to boost the domestic industry, and the regulation of 
financial markets. Although economic liberalization has been taking place in all 
the major South Asian countries since the 1980s, a wide range of interventions 
remains important and necessary for economic growth and political stability. 
Individuals and groups might become involved in corrupt activity to subvert the 
implementation of these interventions. However, here the problem is not the 
interventions themselves, but the state’s lack of capacity to implement them. Here, 
anti-corruption policies should concentrate on strengthening the capacity of the 
state to enforce necessary policies. 
The second type of corruption, concerning necessary interventions that are 
not—or cannot be—regulated by law, is much more problematic. In South Asia, a 
proportion of the widespread political corruption that involves allocating resources 
in a partisan way to maintain political stability is an example of this type of 
corruption. Similarly, interventions to accelerate and promote emerging capitalism 
in countries where domestic capitalism is weak often have to be partisan and 
cannot be recognized in law. These interventions are very likely to result in 
corruption, since they cannot be explicitly recognized in law for political reasons. 
It would be futile to try and target this form of corruption directly, since such 
action would counter the fundamental interests of the state and therefore not be 
implemented. A more feasible, albeit limited, policy would be damage-limitation 
in the short term and, in the longer term, ensuring the country’s rapid progress to a 
position where it would be possible to legalize some of these interventions, or 
achieving political and economic development so that these interventions are no 
longer essential. Unfortunately, this is the area in which feasible anti-corruption 
strategies in South Asia are most lacking. 
The third type of corruption has received more attention than the other types. It 
comprises corrupt acts associated with laws that enable interventions in contexts 
where the interventions themselves are not required. Typical examples of these are 
tariff protection for industries that do not have the potential to achieve the level of 
production of their competitors; or excessive regulation and requirements of 
permissions that have no purpose except to enable bureaucrats to extract bribes 
from businessmen. South Asian countries are well known for enforcing these types 
of regulations. These dysfunctional interventions not only cause direct economic 
damage, but also create secondary damage, as entrepreneurs use corrupt means in 
an attempt to gain monopoly profits or to circumvent futile restrictions. In these 
circumstances the liberal prescription of liberalization and privatization is most 
appropriate, combined with direct anti-corruption measures. However, this is not 
the most important type of corruption in South Asia, and an excessive focus on this 
type hitherto has hindered, rather than aided, the development of feasible anti-
corruption strategies. 
Finally, the worst type of corruption is the fourth one, which is most prevalent 
in areas where the social order has broken down completely. Illegal interventions 
take place that do not serve any economic or political purposes for any groups 
apart from the avaricious ‘officials’ involved in this form of corruption. Thus, this 
type of corruption is based solely on the coercive power of small groups to extort 
from the public. While there are aspects of such extortions in every South Asian 
society, it is only in Afghanistan that it takes on significant proportions. 
Political Corruption 
Political corruption refers to the corruption operated by politicians. In all South 
Asian countries, political corruption can be traced from the highest levels of the 
political establishment, down to the lowest. Unsurprisingly, it has proved difficult 
for the political system to engage credibly in anti-corruption activities lower down 
the hierarchy. In democratic Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, prime 
ministers have been frequently accused of corruption, and have sometimes been 
convicted of criminal offences, as have their authoritarian counterparts in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan during military or authoritarian regimes. In the latter 
countries, where there have been cycles of democracy and dictatorship, no 
significant long-term difference is observed in the extent of corruption under either 
type of regime. This evidence compels us to question the widespread belief that 
corruption is caused by the lack of accountability of public officials. In fact the 
evidence from South Asia shows that electors are very aware of the corruption and 
even criminality of their political representatives but still vote for corrupt 
politicians, often at the expense of ‘clean’ campaigners who occasionally stand 
against them. 
In 1997 the Indian Election Commission conservatively estimated that 40 
members of parliament and 700 state assembly representatives in India, altogether 
equal to 10% of all legislators, had been convicted of serious criminal offences or 
faced serious criminal charges, ranging from extortion to murder. In the 2002 
Indian state elections as many as 20% of the candidates in certain states were 
convicted criminals or had been charged with crimes. The true number of 
legislators involved in crime is likely to be considerably higher than these figures, 
which account for legislators who have already been convicted or whose cases are 
being processed in the courts. It is fairly certain that many other legislators in the 
early 2000s are engaged in criminal activities without being indicted. It is also 
widely perceived in the Indian press and in opinion surveys that the proportion of 
criminals involved in politics is increasing. Yet the freedom of the media in 
reporting political corruption in India is comparable to advanced countries, and 
even in Bangladesh, Pakistan and other South Asian countries, the evidence of 
corrupt activity by leading politicians is well known and freely available. 
When asked to explain their voting decisions, South Asian voters frequently 
report that they vote for ‘mafia-style’ politicians because they have proved able to 
deliver resources and security to powerful local constituents, who in turn provide 
the organizational weight to ensure electoral victories and enforce political order. 
The logic driving this pattern of politics can be better understood once the 
constraints facing the delivery of services and the provision of security are studied. 
As is the case in other developing countries, South Asian states generally lack the 
fiscal resources to perform these functions effectively because their central budgets 
are in structural deficit; funds are not available to provide even the most essential 
services adequately. In these circumstances conflicts over resources are intense; 
‘intermediate-class’ groups often organize themselves around factional symbols, 
based on ethnicity, religion or caste in competing for these resources. Politicians 
subsequently find that they can only be successful if they offer selective benefits to 
at least some of these effectively organized factions. Since providing preferential 
benefits to some but not others is not legal, the legitimacy of the politician is not of 
great concern to his or her most critical supporters. Indeed, a truly honest politician 
would find it impossible to secure any organized support from these critical 
factional groups, and without their support, power cannot be attained. The growing 
malaise of criminality in politics and the rise of factional politics in South Asia is 
at least partly due to the ‘prisoner’s dilemma problem’, where credible politicians 
are excluded by the competition from less scrupulous political entrepreneurs who 
can offer more to factions that are in search of a patron. Thus, while democracy is 
desirable in itself, it has anomalous effects on the extent of corruption. A long-
term change in this pattern of politics is unlikely before economic development has 
proceeded to the point where the central budget can provide sufficient resources 
for honest politicians to stay in power through providing widespread service-
delivery and redistribution. Meanwhile, in the early 2000s, a symbiotic 
relationship between politicians who use political power for personal enrichment 
and the enrichment of their close allies, and the powerful social factions, which 
require access to resources, jobs and contracts (all services that honest politicians 
cannot possibly provide) remains a dominant characteristic in South Asian politics. 
This would explain why all major political parties regularly accuse each other of 
corruption while eagerly recruiting criminals who can offer resources and secure 
the support of powerful factions. It also explains why ordinary citizens criticize 
their politicians for being involved in corruption while simultaneously voting for 
corrupt leaders who they think are most likely to protect their constituency and 
provide their own faction with disproportionate benefits. 
South Asian political corruption is largely of the second type (see above), since 
the current strategies of maintaining political power cannot be legalized, and the 
approach of legitimately maintaining power through the provision of generalized 
benefits is not viable given the level of economic development. This type of 
political corruption may eventually result in sufficient political stability for rapid 
economic growth to take place, as did happen in some South-East Asian countries, 
such as Thailand. This would, subsequently, permit the growth of formal 
budgetary redistributions and service-delivery to take place, thereby allowing more 
honest politics and politicians to emerge in the future. However, in South Asia the 
continual emergence of new groups and factions has meant that, over time, politics 
has become more factional, fragmented and crime-driven. As this continues to 
happen, there is always the risk that more and more political corruption will 
convert into the fourth type, where the criminal activities of politicians enrich only 
themselves, using the coercive force of private mafias to extort from the rest of 
society. In the early 2000s in Afghanistan an extreme version of this fragmentation 
existed, where regional military commanders extorted from society and engaged in 
crime but had no need to enlist the support of any other social groups. However, 
this degree of social fragmentation and the use of coercive force should be 
distinguished from the clientelist politics of other South Asian countries, where 
local mafias have had to engage in a political process of suborning powerful 
groups and forming political coalitions that, however imperfectly, has maintained 
some form of social stability. But in all these cases, where political corruption is 
driven by the demands of politically powerful groups, greater transparency, 
democracy or civil society participation would be unlikely on their own to have a 
significant impact on reducing this type of corruption in South Asia. There is no 
reason to suggest that democracy or transparency would reduce the political 
requests of powerful groups. Indeed, the focus on greater democracy and 
transparency as a method of countering corruption in Bangladesh and Pakistan has 
yielded very disappointing results. In Bangladesh a decade of democracy 
witnessed a rapid rise in corruption. In Pakistan the return of military rule in 1999 
appeared to reduce corruption, although the sustainability of this development will 
be questionable once it becomes necessary for the Government to begin 
constructing wider political support bases to remain in power. 
The greater fiscal capacity necessary for governments to provide legally the 
demands of its constituents will be generated only once the region undergoes 
longer-term economic development. In the mean time, the rapid growth and 
negative effects of political corruption could conceivably be reduced through the 
development of large, inclusive political parties that aim to impose social 
discipline in order to achieve long-term development goals. Such parties would not 
entirely curb political corruption, but might succeed in countering the growing 
fragmentation and factionalization of politics across South Asia. It is not surprising 
that the Indian states that perform relatively better than others are those that are run 
by disciplined and centralized parties; however, such parties are not visible at the 
national level in India. Even in the much smaller countries of South Asia, national 
parties have become loose coalitions of factions, with each faction demanding ever 
greater rewards for not defecting to the opposition. This explains the escalating 
cost of politics in these countries and the escalating cost of political corruption. 
Further, albeit limited, progress towards mitigating the extent of political 
corruption would also be possible through the legalization of large donations to 
political parties. Allowing political parties to pay legally for some of their 
expenses during and after election campaigns would not remove the problem 
entirely, since political organizers demand much more than the cost of organizing 
elections in exchange for their support; nevertheless, it would reduce the need for 
political parties to engage in corrupt or criminal activities simply to raise funds for 
election campaigns. In Bangladesh and India politics is increasingly funded by so-
called ‘black money’ (money generated by crime or from ‘grey’ activities that are 
not declared to avoid paying tax). It has been estimated that the black economy has 
burgeoned to approximately one-third of the size of the official economies in these 
countries. However, attempts to regularize election funding have been blocked by 
other political considerations. In India the proposed Election and Other Related 
Laws Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2001–02 to provide, among other 
measures, income tax exemptions for private and corporate donations to political 
parties. This legislation was stalled in Parliament, partly because it challenged the 
dominant political ideology shared by all major parties that rejects any 
‘disproportionate’ political influence for the rich. Aside from ideology, in an 
emerging economy it is also problematic to legalize donations from such sources 
when much of the wealth of this emerging rich élite is tainted by association with 
sharp practices (a large proportion of the ‘new rich’ has engaged in corrupt 
activity, such as illegally obtaining land, or using political connections to gain 
lucrative contracts). However, although there are problems surrounding political 
fund-raising reform, the current system is far worse. Thus, when the Indian 
Election Commission attempted to prohibit criminals from contesting elections, the 
Government also delayed this proposal. The Indian Election Commission has 
imposed limits on election spending by candidates, but these restrictions have 
proved difficult to enforce; in any case, the limits currently apply only to spending 
by individual candidates and not to expenditure by their political parties. Indeed, 
rather than showing any signs of being constrained by these attempts, it is widely 
perceived that election expenditure is increasing. However, under a new law 
enacted in 2003, all candidates for election have to submit details of any criminal 
case pending against them, a record of their assets and liabilities and their 
educational qualifications. This may help to encourage political parties not to field 
questionable candidates, but it is not clear how reported assets and liabilities can 
be cross-checked to check their accuracy.  
Similar tendencies of entrenched political corruption are observed in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and other South Asian countries. In 2002 the Pakistani 
President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, enforced a strict electoral rule barring 
politicians convicted of criminal offences from contesting elections. However, 
critics argued that the real intention behind the enforcement of this rule was to 
exclude the two prominent civilian political leaders of the country from standing 
against the military regime in elections held later that year. The possibility of 
enforcing such a rule under a future civilian administration is arguable, given the 
pressures outlined above. Attempting to exclude from politics those who have been 
charged with or convicted of criminal offences is also problematic given that in 
countries like Bangladesh the ruling party, upon assuming office, has traditionally 
withdrawn corruption cases against its own supporters and instituted corruption 
cases against its opponents. This was possible because the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Anti-Corruption operated under the Prime Minister’s office. A genuinely 
independent anti-corruption commission responsible for identifying and 
prosecuting corrupt politicians might prove to be a positive development. This has 
certainly been the advice of external agencies, and in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
there has been some progress towards creating such agencies. In Bangladesh, this 
culminated in November 2004 in the establishment of the three-member 
Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (IACC), and the simultaneous abolition 
of the Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption. The IACC has been given the power 
to investigate allegations of corruption against any government servant without 
having to seek government permission, as was previously the case. However, the 
credibility of such commissions remains questionable given that their ability to 
investigate, prosecute, but most of all to enforce punishments depend critically on 
political support from the very quarters that are most likely to be investigated. 
Even the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in Pakistan, which has achieved 
considerable success in recent years in prosecuting public officials and retrieving 
their misappropriated funds, is considered to be an agency of the armed forces 
rather than an independent authority. It is significant that the military (and the 
judiciary) are excluded from its mandate. In India the Central Vigilance 
Commission is regarded as autonomous, but its remit covers only state employees 
and not politicians. Most importantly though, if it is accepted that much political 
corruption in these countries is entrenched and ‘society-driven’, the task of any 
anti-corruption commission would at best be partial in the short term, and this 
would make it difficult for it to defend itself convincingly as non-partisan. 
Bureaucratic Corruption 
Corruption committed by bureaucratic officials in South Asia ranges from the 
petty corruption of police officers collecting nominal bribes for minor traffic 
offences, to multi-million dollar bribes collected by senior army officers and 
defence officials in major military contracts. Bureaucratic corruption is intimately 
connected with political corruption; at the highest levels politicians and 
bureaucrats have to collude in large-scale corrupt activity. Moreover, the 
persistence of low-level bureaucratic corruption cannot be understood without 
taking into account the absence of political will to combat corruption on the part of 
high-level political office-holders who are themselves vulnerable to attack for their 
own corruption. For example, newspapers in South Asian countries frequently 
report stories of police forces being prevented from prosecuting heads of criminal 
organizations or of crime cartels protected by powerful politicians. In such a 
context, were politicians to attempt to curb the internal, comparatively petty 
corruption of the police, their efforts would not be considered very credible. 
A common argument in South Asia is that low bureaucratic pay contributes to 
high levels of bureaucratic corruption. This is undoubtedly true, but it is not clear 
that raising bureaucratic salaries would necessarily reduce corruption. Higher-paid 
bureaucrats would only consider refraining from corrupt activity if it were possible 
to identify the perpetrators and dismiss those who were occasionally caught. 
However, if the political capacity to attack bureaucratic corruption is absent, 
higher salaries may have little effect. Furthermore, bureaucratic corruption takes 
many different forms in South Asian countries, and there are instances of each of 
the four types identified above. First, the misappropriation of funds by bureaucrats 
engaged in the operation of legally recognized regulatory structures that have 
necessary or useful economic or political functions is common. These include 
structures established to regulate markets, promote industry and agriculture, and 
manage subsidies and redistributions that aim to maintain political stability. 
Although these systems of state intervention or regulation are beneficial for 
society, they inevitably confer benefits on some and costs on others and are 
therefore susceptible to either the attempts of bureaucrats to extract a share of the 
benefit by demanding bribes from intended beneficiaries, or attempts by non-
eligible recipients to obtain some of these benefits by offering bribes, or both. The 
degree to which state policy is subverted and the magnitude of the bribes 
determines whether the act of corruption has encouraged or discouraged 
reasonable economic performance or not. If bureaucrats were to implement what 
was intended by policy and then extract bribes, the result would be much more 
favourable than if they were to accept a bribe to subvert what was intended. 
Unfortunately, in many parts of South Asia bureaucratic corruption has 
seriously subverted numerous critical state functions, including regulatory 
functions and the protection of property rights. For instance, corrupt activity has 
subverted the operation of welfare subsidies and of policies to encourage 
industrialization or regional development. Factories that never produce anything 
continue to receive production subsidies or are permitted to roll over their debt to 
publicly owned banks, for example. A further problem is the absence of a 
functioning judicial system. In South Asia many civil cases take more than a 
decade to resolve. The judicial process is susceptible to manipulation: those who 
want to prevent a judgment can pay relatively small bribes on a regular basis to 
delay a case or force an adjournment. Some attempts have been made to address 
these problems through state withdrawal in the form of liberalization and 
privatization. However, progress has been slow and in the case of effective state 
functions, interventions and regulations, state withdrawal is not a solution. 
Nevertheless, strategies of liberalization and privatization were introduced in 
the major South Asian countries from the 1980s onwards; an acceleration of 
liberalization occurred in the 1990s. In India the average tariff rate was reduced 
from 87% in 1990 to 25% by 1998. Licensing of industries and controls over 
imports were almost entirely removed. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the 
nationalization process that took place in the 1970s was reversed through extensive 
privatization programmes. Some of the restrictions that were removed had no 
potentially positive function, and little was lost as a result. However, other parts of 
the regulatory structure had been intended to accelerate the development of local 
entrepreneurial capacity through industrial policy and protection, or to maintain 
internal regional and social balance, and here state withdrawal was potentially 
damaging. Even the privatization of large enterprises in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
in the absence of effective regulatory structures and safeguards often resulted in 
inefficiency and subsidy appropriation in the private sector replacing the 
inefficiency and deficits of the public sector. In India liberalization of financial 
markets resulted in dramatic allegations in 2001 of widespread share price 
manipulation in the stock market and multi-million dollar irregularities in India’s 
largest investment fund, the Unit Trust of India. Moreover, the withdrawal of the 
state from traditional redistributive and regulatory functions has resulted in the 
development of illegal redistributive mechanisms governed by the type of criminal 
organizations described in the section on political corruption. Finally, in the case 
of the police force and judiciary, state withdrawal is not even possible. In fact, the 
appropriate response in all cases of corruption associated with the subversion of 
essential state functions is to strengthen state capacities. Progress on this front has 
been limited across South Asia. If the state had the capacity to enforce decisions 
that were beneficial for society, bribery committed by public servants would be 
undesirable but would not subvert development goals completely. However, where 
corruption undermines the enforcement of necessary regulations, the results are 
much more detrimental. This is an important aspect in the difference between 
corruption in high-growth and low-growth economies. 
The second type of bureaucratic corruption that emerges because a legal 
framework to enforce a large number of necessary state actions or decisions does 
not exist is more prevalent and causes greater problems for government anti-
corruption policy. In the same way that political stability in South Asia is partially 
dependent on powerful factional groups receiving disproportionate benefits, 
rationing scarce resources often requires disproportionate amounts of resources 
being allocated to the rich, or to emerging capitalists. Although developing 
countries are often legally committed to granting equal access to public resources 
to all citizens, if public resources become very scarce, not only will the rich be 
willing to pay a high price to gain privileged access, but it may also be desirable to 
give emerging capitalists privileged access to some resources to accelerate growth. 
However, state agencies involved in the allocation of public resources, such as 
land rights, credit, and other scarce resources, or indeed any aspect of regulation or 
service-delivery, are legally bound to operate according to rules that are far 
removed from the reality of stark differences in the purchasing power, economic 
potential, social status or political influence of claimants. In all these cases, 
alternative rationing devices are used in practice, based either on willingness to 
pay or political power. This kind of corruption is ubiquitous, ranging from the 
illegal sale of formally free hospital services, to the allocation of government land 
for new developments in exchange for bribes. These types of corruption are 
difficult to deal with because state capacity alone is not the issue. The real obstacle 
is that, for political reasons, realistic criteria for resource allocation cannot be 
legally recognized. Some legal changes could be enforced to improve the situation, 
for instance introducing a nominal fee for some services that would be sufficient to 
achieve rationing. In most cases, however, charging would not solve the problem 
because the market price that would balance demand and supply would not be 
politically acceptable. In any case, it is not desirable that all public resources 
should be allocated through the market; however, where resources are publicly 
allocated on the basis of need or any other criteria, sufficient resources have to be 
available to meet the demands from all those who satisfy these criteria. Since this 
requirement is generally not met in developing countries, there may be no 
alternative but to endure some of this corrupt activity until the economy is 
developed enough to provide the state with sufficient funds to allocate resources in 
the way expected by law. In the mean time, the only policy response would be to 
strengthen state capacities and prevent egregious violations, although these actions 
alone would clearly not remove this type of corruption. 
Much of the anti-corruption strategy advocated by international agencies is 
dominated by the assumption that the third type of corruption is the dominant force 
in South Asia. This is the corruption associated with unnecessary legislation that 
hampers the operation of markets and creates opportunities for corruption among 
relatively poorly paid public officials. This type of corruption is associated with 
entirely unnecessary and damaging state interventions in the form of legislation, 
and could easily be dealt with by removing such restrictions. It is not hard to find 
many examples of excessively restrictive and apparently superfluous regulations in 
all South Asian countries. These include requirements to fill in many different 
forms for all kinds of permissions, which are then subject to inordinate delays. 
Whether it is an application for a passport or even an attempt to pay the correct 
amount of tax on time, the ordinary citizen faces endless delays and irritation. 
However, while this type of corruption is irritating, it is only a part, and perhaps a 
small part, of the overall problem. The conventional policies of liberalization, 
privatization and greater accountability would appear to be the most relevant 
solutions to this type of corruption, but they may have little overall effect in either 
reducing corruption or mitigating its negative effects when we consider all types of 
corruption together. Moreover, many of the procedures of bureaucratic record-
keeping, on which this type of corruption is based, are very difficult to change 
rapidly even with liberalization and privatization. After more than a decade of 
liberalization in a number of South Asian countries, the daily procedures of the 
bureaucracy have undergone some simplification, but a great deal more progress 
needs to be achieved. Furthermore, liberalization has added new regulatory 
burdens on the state with respect to financial markets and the corporate sector. 
Liberalized markets require strong and effective regulatory frameworks to operate 
properly, and the absence of adequate state capacity in these areas has created a 
paradox whereby corruption of the first type has increased in the aftermath of 
liberalization. This explains why, when all types of corruption are studied together, 
journalistic reports or corruption perception indices record rapidly worsening 
corruption in South Asia in the 1980s, precisely when liberalization began to be 
introduced. 
Finally, South Asian countries suffer to varying extents from corruption linked 
to extortion and other forms of crime. By definition, extortion offers no economic 
or political benefits to anyone other than the extortionists. There are many low-
level examples of this type of extortion in all South Asian countries, particularly 
involving the police force, customs officials and, increasingly, criminal 
organizations associated with the political élite. Individuals without political 
connections and patrons, for example, are regularly forced to pay police officers 
bribes in exchange for a (temporary) end to harassment. Also, political mafias 
seize land from the weak, encouraged by the knowledge that the criminal justice 
system repeatedly fails the aggrieved. However, only in Afghanistan has the 
central state apparatus collapsed to the point where this type of corruption plays a 
significant role in the operation of the economy as a whole. In other South Asian 
countries there are pockets of extortion, but the state still retains enough 
centralized coercive capacity to limit its extent and is able and willing occasionally 
to use this capacity for the simple reason that extortion is a threat to the survival of 
the state itself. It is not enough to expect democratic pressure to limit this type of 
corruption because unarmed citizens are not likely to be able to stop extortion 
through a democratic process. The coercive capacity of the central state is the 
critical determinant of the extent to which this type of corruption can grow. So far, 
at least, most South Asian countries still have central states that have been able to 
limit the uncontrolled growth of extortion. 
Prospects 
A large number of mechanisms have contributed to the entrenchment of 
corruption and the associated problems of governance in South Asian countries. 
Foremost amongst these has been the deep-rooted phenomenon of political 
corruption, and its growth over time, closely connected to the growing 
fragmentation of politics in South Asia. Since political corruption has become 
embedded in the democratic process, its removal is likely to be a long-term effort. 
Significant progress is likely to depend on economic development, which will 
allow the state to enhance tax collection and redistribute more resources legally in 
order to achieve political stability. As well as being an important issue in itself, the 
reduction of political corruption would also allow the diminution of different types 
of bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic corruption persists and thrives largely 
because the political élite is dependent on corruption for its survival. An 
examination of the significance of different types of bureaucratic corruption in 
South Asia shows why moves towards liberalization and privatization have had 
anomalous effects on corruption; in the short term, at least, the economic 
developments have appeared to contribute to an increase in corruption. The public 
concern with corruption and the role of the media and of NGOs have so far also 
had limited effects on reducing corruption even in the more democratic countries 
of South Asia. The more prevalent types of corruption in South Asia have 
particularly damaging effects on economic performance for a number of reasons. 
First, political fragmentation has always been prevalent in these countries and 
appears to be increasing. Greater fragmentation is likely to lead to more extensive 
political corruption and reduce the ability of central states to control the predatory 
tendencies of competing factions. Second, bureaucratic corruption has been 
particularly damaging in South Asia because state capacities have not been strong 
enough to prevent the subversion of essential state functions and interventions. 
Enhancing state capacities across the entire range of state functions is a 
particularly important task in all South Asian countries. Expanding state capacity 
is not likely to reduce all levels of corruption in the short term, but is expected to 
enhance governance by ensuring that economic development and political stability 
are achieved to a greater extent. Finally, the problem of military factionalism 
(although it is prominent only in Afghanistan) has emerged in the milder form of 
mafia-dominated politics in all the major South Asian countries, drawing attention 
once again to the importance of enhancing central state capacities in all these 
countries. 
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